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Last July 3rd, several representatives of the three secessionist parties in Catalonia – PDEcat, ERC and CUP –
presented the draft of the so-called Self-Determination Referendum Act, an ad-hoc statute that is meant to
regulate the process of a referendum on the secession of Catalonia. In the morning, the draft was presented in
the Catalan Parliament. It was basically an informal presentation for the press, with no official value, in which the
other parties refused to be present. In the afternoon, this informal draft was presented to the wider public by
several members of the Catalan Government in such as unusual setting as a theater – the National Theater of
Catalonia –, in an event with a TV show format. The mise-en-scène could not be more theatrical. Technically, this
draft is not a bill yet, since it has not been introduced into the Catalan legislature. Probably it will be this August,
in the middle of the vacation period in Spain. But this draft bill is very interesting from a constitutional point of
view, and we should all pay some attention to it. Let me explain why.
The Catalan Self-Determination Referendum Act, as I said, is an ad-hoc piece of legislation that regulates only
one specific referendum process: the referendum on the secession of Catalonia from Spain. It is a one-shot
legislation. It establishes who will vote, how the process will be conducted, how the campaign should proceed,
and how should it be reflected by the media. It creates a specific Electoral Commission, and regulates who and
how will be able to submit complains to it. It determines the question to be asked in the referendum, and
establishes the conditions in which it will be considered approved. And it even fixes the date in which such
referendum is supposed to be held – October the 1st –, and prefigures what will be the institutional
consequences of a majoritarian yes- or no-vote. None of this is truly internationally remarkable. What is
exceptional, especially from a constitutional point of view, is that this piece of legislation will create a transitional
constitutional regime, which constitutes of course a constitutional coup d’état from the standing point of the
Spanish constitutional legality, and a regime that is scheduled to die automatically in October the 3rd. If this draft
bill is finally approved by the Catalan parliament, and if the Spanish constitutional court does not immediately
strike it down, which is almost impossible not to happen, it will constitute the fastest constitutional regime ever.
But let me start with the boring stuff. And, first, here it is some background. It is well known that the Rajoy
Administration in Spain does not authorize Catalans to vote in a secession referendum. The secessionist ranks
in Catalonia have been pressing for years in order to be able to have a vote on this issue. It is controversial, from
a technical point of view, whether the Spanish constitution would allow for such a referendum. For those who
claim it would, the key issue is that a primer minister’s authorization is required. But even if such referendum is
not compatible with the current constitution, it is obvious that the constitution might be amended to make room
for it. And this, again, depends on the agreement of Partido Popular (jointly with other majoritarian political
forces). Thus, in any case, the refusal by Rajoy and Partido Popular of allowing the Catalans to vote on
secession makes it legally impossible to hold such referendum. This is important in order to understand that the
secessionist parties in Catalonia, fully determined to hold the referendum anyway, have drafted this bill with the
manifested intention to break or disobey the – Spanish – law. There is no discussion, then, about whether such
bill is constitutional or not. It is obviously not. And no one among the secessionist is naïf enough to believe that it
will not be challenged before, and struck down by, the Constitutional Court in a few days after his parliamentary
approval – which we can also take for granted, since the secessionist parties have a majority of seats in the
Catalan parliament. The announced secessionist strategy will consist in continuing to operate under the basis of
this new law, and hold the referendum anyway, thus disobeying what the Spanish Constitutional Court may have
said, and being aware that this will condemn the referendum to a framework of illegality. As well known as all of
this is for everyone in Catalonia and Spain, the draft bill faces several significant difficulties precisely derived
from the fact that it is supposed to operate in such framework of illegality.
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One of these difficulties is that the Catalan government does not possess any electoral register or roll, which is in
possession of the Spanish electoral authorities. The Self-Determination Referendum draft bill establishes that
the same people who are allowed to vote in the elections to the Catalan parliament will be able to vote in the
referendum. But, despite the rumors that they might have had illegal access to the register, the Catalan
government does not have any means to know who exactly are those. Thus, de facto, anyone interested in
voting will be able to attend to the polling station, declare that she is allowed to vote in the Catalan legislative
elections, and cast her ballot in the referendum.
The draft bill establishes the question for the referendum: Do you want Catalonia to become an independent
state with the form of a republic? And only two possible answers will be allowed: yes or no. The bill even
establishes how the ballot should look like. But the two more controversial issues are these: it does neither
establish a turnout validity threshold, nor an approval threshold. It is true that other secession referendums have
not established thresholds either. But it is important to understand that this one will be held in a framework of
illegality. If only secessionists finally go to vote, as most in Catalonia expect, it well might happen that the
referendum gets a 95% of approval from a 40% turnout. And, according to the bill, the Catalan parliament will
have to declare the independence of Catalonia within 48 hours. In effect, the draft bill prefigures what
institutional consequences will follow from its results. If yes wins, the parliament will be obliged to immediately
declare independence. If it’s no who wins, it will be obliged to call for ordinary elections. The draft is very clear to
say that the secession referendum will be absolutely binding, to the point of prefiguring such legal obligations for
the parliament.
Another controversial aspect of the draft bill concerns the electoral guarantees of the referendum. Given that
only secessionists are determined to hold the referendum in the framework of illegality, everything seems to
indicate that this will be a referendum designed, organized, supervised, and whose ballots will be counted, by
only one side in the debate. Even the five members of the Electoral Commission – the Sindicatura Electoral de
Catalunya – will be appointed by the secessionist majority in the Catalan parliament, given that the anti-
secessionist forces refuse to collaborate with the organization of an illegal referendum. And this fact might be of
high importance, given that a referendum in a framework of illegality is expected to generate many doubts and
complaints that only such Sindicatura Electoral will be able to handle and solve.
Finally, another controversial feature of the bill is that, as any other electoral or referendum regulation, it
establishes the conditions in which those who will work in the polling stations will be selected and take care of
the whole process. The draft bill, mirroring the general electoral procedures in Spain, says that the thousands of
citizens who will be required to work in those polling stations will be appointed by lottery. They will have the legal
obligation to attend to collaborate with the process. But such obligation will only exist according to such
referendum act, which presumably will have been struck down by the constitutional court. What is more, any
collaboration with the referendum process by those citizens, or by the Catalan civil servants asked to supervise
and manage the process, will be considered illegal according to the Spanish constitutional law, as the
Constitutional Court jurisprudence has recently established (for instance, in the judicial order 24/2017, of
February 14th). It is interesting, at this respect, that Article 3.3 establishes legal immunity for the authorities who
participate in the “preparation, celebration, and/or implementation of the referendum’s results”. Such immunity,
however, will stop producing effects as soon as the act itself is struck down or suspended.
For all these reasons, this draft bill raises significant concerns regarding not only its legality, but also the
guarantees and legitimacy for the secession referendum. In terms of its democratic legitimacy, it is important to
mention an additional worry. The bill, as any other piece of legislation, will be presumably passed by the Catalan
parliament with the support of the majority of its members. The three secessionist parties control 72 out of the
135 seats. But this majority falls short of the kind of supermajority that would be required to reform the Catalan
Estatut, the sort of regional constitution from which all regional powers are derived. Thus, some might be
concerned that a legislation as disruptive, and at the same time as fundamental as this one, which will
necessarily involve a breakdown in the Catalan and Spanish legality, is passed by a lower majority, and
therefore gather much less social consensus and support, than the one that was required to adopt and reform
the Estatut. What is more, that majority in parliament actually represented 48% of the voters in the last election –
which turned into a majority of seats only due to the overrepresentation of the rural areas. So such secessionist
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block, which is the only one giving support to the referendum statute, is not even representative of a majority of
voters in Catalonia. This brings me to my last point, and the most interesting aspect of this draft bill.
Under the surface of an ad-hoc specific referendum regulation, the draft bill includes two articles of obvious
constitutional nature. Article 2 declares the sovereignty of Catalonia: “The Catalan people is a sovereign political
subject, and, as such, it exercises its right to free and democratic choice, which is its political condition.” Article 3
develops this idea of sovereignty by declaring, in section 1, that “the Parliament of Catalonia acts as a
representative of the Catalan people’s sovereignty”. And section 2 of the same Article 3 says that “this Act
establishes an exceptional legal regime in order to regulate and guarantee the self-determination referendum in
Catalonia. It hierarchically prevails over any norm that might be in conflict with it, for it regulates the exercise of
an unalienable, fundamental right of the people of Catalonia.”
It is obvious that Articles 2 and 3 transcend the level of legislation and establish a constitutional regime. First,
they proclaim the political sovereignty of a people. Second, they declare this legal provision to be a fundamental,
supreme norm that prevails to any other, Catalan, Spanish, or even international. As a constitutional regime,
though, it is exceptional in two senses. First, it is circumscribed to the organization of a secession referendum. In
the Final Disposition 1, it explicitly acknowledges that the rest of the legal system of any order will continue to be
applicable in Catalonia insofar as it does not contradict the present act. And second, because of the first, it is
transitional, and it actually establishes the time constraints in which it will operate. The Final Disposition 2, in
effect, this act’s provisions will stop being valid once the results of the referendum have been proclaimed”.
Thus, as soon as this draft bill is passed by the Catalan parliament in the following weeks, a transitional
constitutional regime of a new form will have been enacted in Catalonia. This new constitutional regime will
widely clash with the Spanish constitutional legality. And everything indicates that the Spanish Constitutional
Court will react immediately by striking down this legislation, and probably indicting several members of the
Catalan government. However, the Catalan authorities, under control of the secessionist parties, have
announced that they will proceed in any case under such Catalan transitional constitutional regime. This will be
the first constitutional coup d’état since the creation of the European Union. And will create a first-order
constitutional problem in Europe. How should the Spanish government handle this situation? How should the EU
authorities and the other European governments react to it? How should the citizens in Catalonia face this
terrible institutional breakdown? Is it democratically legitimate to enact a disruptive, constitutional coup d’état
with only 48% of popular support? These are very relevant political questions that we should all start to answer.
But, in parallel, this case also raises interesting questions from the point of view of constitutional law. When a
referendum is meant to operate in a framework of constitutional illegality, as in the Catalan case, it seems to
require some kind of transitional constitutional regime of this kind. How else it could proceed and do things that
are constitutionally forbidden under the assumption that the results will be politically – and legally – valid? The
Catalan secession referendum will certainly be not the first referendum – whether of secession or not – in
breaking explicitly the legality of the system. How should constitutional law theory capture this kind of
breakdowns? Under what conditions might they be held to be democratically legitimate? Can we learn something
from the current scenario in Catalonia? All these also strike me to be very interesting questions, and
constitutional lawyers should start offering responses.
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